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1 Introduction
In the last decades skilled labor has become increasingly mobile and the bulk of skilled immi-
grants acquired publicly ﬁnanced education in their home country.1 This potentially creates
severe problems in the source countries of migrants and the consequence may be detrimental
ﬁscal competition, with countries underinvesting in higher education in order to avoid brain
drain and to attract high-skilled foreign immigrants (Justman and Thisse, 1997, 2000). This
raises the question whether policy coordination could improve social welfare when skilled labor
is mobile and how it changes the migration ﬂows.2
In this paper, we develop and analyze a two-country model to examine the implications of
ﬁscal competition in public education expenditures under international mobility of high-skilled
labor. To capture the idea of higher education (instead of basic, compulsory education), we
model education as the outcome of individual choice. With education being publicly ﬁnanced,
our model generates “agglomeration” eﬀects from migration on the tax base in both source and
host country; that is, higher emigration reduces the tax base in the source country and increases
it in the host country, thereby further reinforcing migration incentives.3 Due to the existence of
agglomeration eﬀects, it may be the case that, for given public spending levels and depending
on the belief structure in the economy, migration may or may not occur in equilibrium, thereby
potentially creating the problem of multiplicity of equilibria. We carefully address the issue in
our analysis in a way which may be useful also in other political games with multiple equilibria.
Motivated by the recent endeavor in Europe to reach a higher degree of coordination in
tertiary education (for instance, due to the Bologna process), we study potential gains from
coordinated policy setting in the context of public education and international migration. We
analyze the behavior of cooperative governments which aim to maximize the aggregate welfare
of non-migrants (with transfers across countries to compensate losers), whereas a social planner
would also consider the utility of migrants. The justiﬁcation for this approach is that national
governments target the median voter in their country, who is most likely a non-migrant. We
show that from the perspective of a utilitarian social planner, bilateral coordination of edu-
cation policies does not necessarily solve the problem arising from ﬁscal competition. On the
one hand, bilateral coordination tends to increase public education expenditure compared to
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the non-cooperative levels. On the other hand, however, bilaterally coordinated policies have
consequences for the desired migration pattern. While coordination favors non-migration, the
social planner may prefer brain drain in order to extract migration gains. In fact, we demon-
strate that an endeavor to stop migration through a bilateral contract may even reduce welfare
compared to a non-cooperative equilibrium. Moreover, we show that policy coordination may
not always be successful in preventing brain drain, depending on the belief structure and mi-
gration costs. In this case, government cooperation may reverse the direction of the migration
ﬂow compared to both non-cooperative policy setting and the social optimum.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 analyzes the equilibrium for a given public education policy. In Section 4, we examine
how governments have to adjust their education expenditure in order to avoid brain drain
when labor market integration reduces migration costs for high-skilled workers. Section 5
analyzes non-cooperative policy setting. In Section 6 we explore the consequences of cooperation
between governments for public education expenditure and migration patterns; these patterns
are compared to both non-cooperative policy setting and the social planner solution. The last
section presents our conclusions. Due to space constraints, we do not present formal proofs of
lemmata and propositions in this paper but refer the interested reader to the working paper
version of our manuscript in Egger, Falkinger, and Grossman (2007).
2 The Model
Consider two open economies indexed 퐻 and 퐹 (“home” and “foreign”) with two types of
labor. High-skilled workers (at least a certain share of them) are mobile and look for the
best income possibilities in the two economies. In contrast, the labor markets for low-skilled
workers are internationally segmented.4 The two types of labor are used to manufacture a
single homogenous (nume´raire) good, 푌 푗, 푗 = 퐻,퐹 , according to
푌 푗 = 퐹 푗(푆푗, 퐿푗) = 퐴푗
(
푆푗
)훽 (
퐿푗
)1−훽
, (1)
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where 퐴푗 > 0 and 훽 ∈ (0, 1). 푆푗, 퐿푗 are eﬃciency units of high-skilled and low-skilled labor in
푗 = 퐻,퐹 . 퐴푗 denotes total factor productivity in country 푗.
In either country, there is a unit mass of workers, indexed 푖 ∈ [0, 1], who make two decisions:
ﬁrst, whether or not to acquire higher education; and, second, if high-skilled, whether or not
to migrate to the other country in order to live and work there. Individuals take the migration
decision into account when deciding whether or not to acquire education. That is, individuals
are aware of earning opportunities abroad as well as at home. They are endowed with one unit
of time. Acquisition of education requires 푒¯ ∈ [0, 1) units of time, so that 1− 푒¯ is the residual
working time of an educated individual.
Utility of an individual 푖 living at home is simply given by the level of consumption, 퐶 (푖).
Living abroad implies that utility is given by a discounted value of consumption which re-
ﬂects the social costs of living in a foreign environment. Formally, the utility of migrant 푖 is
given by 퐶 (푖) / (1 + 휃푎 (푖)), where 푎 (푖) = 1 for a mass 푞 ∈ (0, 1) of high-skilled workers and
푎 (푖) prohibitively high for the rest of them.5 Parameter 휃 reﬂects the degree of international
integration. A decline in 휃 means a more mobile high-skilled labor force.
An individual without higher education supplies one eﬃciency unit of low-skilled labor, so
that employment 퐿푗 is equal to the mass of low-skilled workers in country 푗. The eﬃciency units
of high-skilled labor supplied by an educated worker depend on the quality of the education
system, which is determined by the level of local public education expenditure퐺푗. An individual
born in country 푗 acquires 퐺푗 units of high-skilled labor if he/she chooses education. Let
푠푗 = 1 − 퐿푗 denote the mass of educated workers and 휇푗 (휇푘) denote the mass of high-skilled
workers educated in 푗 (푘) who migrate to country 푘 ∕= 푗 (푗 ∕= 푘). Then the total amount of
eﬃciency units of high-skilled labor employed in country 푗 = 퐻,퐹 is given by
푆푗 = (1− 푒¯) [(1− 퐿푗 − 휇푗)퐺푗 + 휇푘퐺푘] , 푘 ∕= 푗. (2)
3 Equilibrium Patterns of Brain Drain
Let 푤푗푆 and 푤
푗
퐿 denote country 푗’s wage rate per eﬃciency unit of high-skilled and low-skilled
labor, respectively. Education is ﬁnanced by a proportional wage income tax, with tax rate
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휏 푗 ∈ [0, 1) in 푗 = 퐻,퐹 . Then, the consumption of a native individual from 퐻 is given by
퐶퐻 =
⎧⎨⎩
(1− 푒¯) (1− 휏퐻)푤퐻푆 퐺퐻 if high skilled and working in 퐻,
(1− 푒¯) (1− 휏퐹 )푤퐹푆퐺퐻 if high skilled and working in 퐹,(
1− 휏퐻)푤퐻퐿 if low skilled.
(3)
A worker who stays in her/his country of birth must be indiﬀerent as to the choice between
acquiring education or remaining low skilled in equilibrium. According to (3), this implies that
휙 ≡ 1
1− 푒¯ = 휔
퐻퐺퐻 , (4)
where 휔퐻 ≡ 푤퐻푆 /푤퐻퐿 is the relative wage rate of high-skilled to low-skilled labor in country 퐻 in
terms of eﬃciency units.6 For the migration decision of high-skilled individuals, consumption
level (1− 푒¯) (1− 휏퐻)푤퐻푆 퐺퐻 when staying at home has to be compared with the discounted
consumption level when migrating, (1− 푒¯) (1− 휏퐹 )푤퐹푆퐺퐻/ (1 + 휃). A high-skilled worker born
and educated in 퐻 moves to 퐹 if and only if
1 + 휃 <
(1− 휏퐹 )푤퐹푆
(1− 휏퐻)푤퐻푆
. (5)
Condition (5) implies that migration can go only in one direction. Thus, either 휇퐻 ≥ 0 and
휇퐹 = 0, or 휇퐻 = 0 and 휇퐹 ≥ 0 in the following analysis.
Lemma 1 Let 푏 ≡ 훽훽(1− 훽)1−훽. The net wage in country 푗 = 퐻,퐹 is positive if
퐺푗 < 퐺¯푗(휇푗) ≡
(
1− 휇푗
휙훽
푏퐴푗
) 1
1−훽
. (6)
Moreover, for 휇퐻 ≥ 0, 휇퐹 = 0, 휏퐻푤퐻푆 = 휙/(1 − 휇퐻), 휏퐹푤퐹푆 = 휙/[1 + 휇퐻퐺퐻/퐺퐹 ], and the
relative net wage is given by:
(1− 휏퐹 )푤퐹푆
(1− 휏퐻)푤퐻푆
=
푏퐴퐹
(
휙/퐺퐹
)1−훽 − 휙/ [1 + 휇퐻퐺퐻/퐺퐹 ]
푏퐴퐻 (휙/퐺퐻)1−훽 − 휙/ [1− 휇퐻 ] ≡ 휒
퐻
(
휇퐻
)
. (7)
휒퐻
(
휇퐻
)
is increasing in 휇퐻 and 퐺퐻 , while decreasing in 퐺퐹 .
5
The further analysis assumes that 퐺푗 is smaller than the exogenous level 퐺¯푗(푞), 푗 = 퐻,퐹 .
Thus, as 푞 is the maximal emigration rate, condition (6) is satisﬁed. 휒퐻(휇퐻) represents the
incentives to migrate from 퐻 to 퐹 , which – according to (5) – have to be compared with the
cost 1 + 휃. For 휇퐻 = 0, 휇퐹 ≥ 0, an analogous expression 휒퐹 (휇퐹 ) describes the incentives to
migrate from 퐹 to 퐻.
As migrants take their education level with them to the foreign country, the (relative) wage
rate per eﬃciency unit of skilled labor is decisive for the migration decision. However, the wage
per eﬃciency unit in 퐻, 푤퐻푆 , is decreasing in 퐺
퐻 . The reason is that higher education ﬁnance
raises the supply of skills for a given fraction of individuals which choose higher education.
Thus, an increase in 퐺퐻 makes the home country more prone to brain drain. Furthermore, the
government in 퐻 must increase its tax revenues in order to ﬁnance the additional expenditures
associated with an increase in 퐺퐻 . While in an economy without migration the tax burden per
eﬃciency unit of high-skilled workers, 휏퐻푤퐻푆 , stays constant when the government increases
퐺퐻 , the resepective burden rises from 휙 to 휙/(1 − 휇퐻) if there is brain drain from 퐻 to 퐹 ,
that is, if 휇퐻 > 0 and 휇퐹 = 0. The tax payment per eﬃciency unit of high-skilled labor in 퐹
is 휙/(1 + 휇퐻퐺퐻/퐺퐹 ). Inﬂow 휇퐻 of high-skilled labor from 퐻 broadens 퐹 ’s tax base so that
the tax burden per individual declines. Thus, the tax channel strengthens the incentives of
high-skilled workers to leave 퐻, and it generates agglomeration eﬀects in favor of the receiver
country.
Figure 1 shows 휒퐻
(
휇퐻
)
and 휒퐹
(
휇퐹
)
for given levels of productivity and education expen-
diture. Without loss of generality, 퐺퐻/퐺퐹 ≥ (퐴퐻/퐴퐹 )1/(1−훽) is assumed. (Note that the roles
of 퐻 and 퐹 can be exchanged in the following discussion.) 휒퐻
(
휇퐻
)
is an increasing function
of 휇퐻 , which starts at
휒퐻(0) =
푏퐴퐹
(
휙/퐺퐹
)1−훽 − 휙
푏퐴퐻 (휙/퐺퐻)1−훽 − 휙 ≥ 1, (8)
and goes to inﬁnity as 휇퐻 approaches푚퐻 ≡ 1−휙훽 (퐺퐻)1−훽 / (푏퐴퐻). Function 휒퐹 (휇퐹 ) starts at
휒퐹 (0) = 1/휒퐻(0) > 0 and approaches inﬁnity as 휇퐹 approaches 푚퐹 ≡ 1− 휙훽 (퐺퐹 )1−훽 /(푏퐴퐹 ).
At 푚푗, 푗 = 퐻,퐹 , brain drain would erode 푗’s tax base so that ﬁnancing 퐺푗 would become
6
unfeasible. Condition 퐺푗 < 퐺¯푗(푞) implies 휇푗 ≤ 푞 < 푚푗 and thus restricts the analysis to
feasible education levels.
Fχ Hχ ( )H Hχ μ( )F Fχ μ
HBH?
1 θ′′+
FB
B
1 θ′+
( )0Hχ
1
FB?
1 θ+
( )0Fχ
qHμ? Hm HμFμ q Fμ?Fm
( )
Figure 1. Migration incentives and migration equilibria:  ( )1/ 1/ /H F H FG G A A β−≥Figure 1: Migration incentives and migration equilibria: 퐺퐻/퐺퐹 ≥ (퐴퐻/퐴퐹 )1/(1−훽)
Comparing the returns to migration to the cost of working in a foreign country, we see that
the following patterns of brain drain hold in equilibrium. If migration costs are high (1 + 휃′′ in
Figure 1), then 휒푗 (휇푗) ≤ 휒푗(푞) < 1 + 휃′′ for all 휇푗 ≤ 푞. Thus, according to (5), no educated
worker will leave his/her home country and only non-migration can hold in equilibrium in this
case. At cost 1 + 휃′, non-migration is still an equilibrium since 휒퐹 (0) < 휒퐻(0) < 1 + 휃′.
However, 퐵˜퐻 and 퐵퐻 are also equilibria. At 휇˜퐻 , individuals are indiﬀerent as to whether they
will work abroad or in their home country. But any deviation to the left eliminates migration
(휒퐻
(
휇퐻
)
< 1 + 휃′ for 휇퐻 < 휇˜퐻), whereas any deviation to the right induces more migration
(휒퐻
(
휇퐻
)
> 1 + 휃′ for 휇퐻 > 휇˜퐻). We call such an equilibrium unstable. In contrast, 퐵퐻
is a stable equilibrium since 휒퐻(푞) > 1 + 휃′ and all mobile workers have gone from 퐻 to 퐹 .
If migration costs diminish further, migration from 퐹 to 퐻 can also be an equilibrium. For
instance, at cost 1 + 휃, we have an unstable equilibrium 퐵˜퐹 and a stable equilibrium 퐵퐹 ,
in addition to equilibrium 퐵퐻 . Throughout the following analysis, we focus on the stable
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equilibria, that is, either 휇퐻 = 휇퐹 = 0, 휇퐻 = 푞, or 휇퐹 = 푞.
In the next section, we examine for given education policies퐺퐻 , 퐺퐹 whether a non-migration
equilibrium can be sustained when international labor markets for high-skilled workers become
more integrated. We also explain how we deal with policy combinations that give rise to
multiple migration equilibria.
4 Opening up the Labor Market for Given Policy
Suppose that up to now, high-skilled workers have worked where they were educated. As in
Figure 1, let 휒퐹 (0) < 휒퐻(0). Now suppose migration costs decline from 휃′′ to 휃 (such that
휒퐻(0) > 1 + 휃 > 휒퐹 (0)). In this case, as 휒퐻 is increasing in 퐺퐻 , domestic education policy is
too ambitious relative to total factor productivity and mobile high-skilled workers of country
퐻 beneﬁt from leaving their home country and working abroad. The resulting brain drain from
퐻 to 퐹 has detrimental consequences for immobile workers in 퐻, whose tax burden increases.
Therefore, a crucial question facing national policymakers is how education expenditure can be
adjusted in order to prevent this brain drain.
If 휃 approaches zero, an outcome without migration is feasible only if countries 퐻 and 퐹
choose their policies in such a way that 휒퐻(0) = 휒퐹 (0) = 1. In this case, locations 퐻 and
퐹 are equally attractive for high-skilled workers. According to (7), this requires 퐺퐻/퐺퐹 =(
퐴퐻/퐴퐹
)1/(1−훽)
. In Figure 2, line 퐸퐴 with slope
(
퐴퐻/퐴퐹
)1/(1−훽)
represents the locus of equal
attractiveness.
An outcome with 휇퐻 = 0 requires 1 + 휃 ≥ 휒퐻(0). Using (8), this gives us the following
constraint:
퐺퐻
퐺퐹
≤ 휌퐻0
(
퐴퐻
퐴퐹
) 1
1−훽
, (9)
with
휌퐻0 ≡
[
1 + 휃
1 + 휃휙훽 (퐺퐹 )1−훽 / (푏퐴퐹 )
] 1
1−훽
.
Condition (9) deﬁnes the set of policy combinations that are consistent with 휇퐻 = 0. The
bound of this set is the incentive constraint for non-migration, represented by 퐼퐻0 in Figure 2.
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According to (6),
(
퐺퐹
)1−훽
< 푏퐴퐹/휙훽. Thus, for 휃 > 0, 휌퐻0 > 1 and 퐼
퐻
0 lies above the 퐸퐴 line.
Moreover, as 퐺퐹 increases, 휌퐻0 decreases from (1+휃)
1/(1−훽), for 퐺퐹 = 0, to one, for 퐺퐹 = 퐺¯퐹 (0)
(use (6)). This explains the concave shape of 퐼퐻0 as shown in Figure 2.
Policy combinations on line 퐼퐻0 fulﬁll the condition that 휒
퐻(0) = 1 + 휃 and, therefore,
render mobile high-skilled workers indiﬀerent as to whether they should stay at home or work
abroad. 휌퐻0 describes country 퐻’s scope for 휇
퐻 = 0 supporting policy. When 휃 declines, the
scope for raising education expenditure above the 퐸퐴 line narrows. To determine which policy
combinations are consistent with 휇퐹 = 0, we have added locus 퐼퐹0 in Figure 2. The set of policy
combinations that are consistent with non-migration is bounded by 퐼퐻0 and 퐼
퐹
0 .
But do governments really succeed in preventing brain drain by choosing policy combinations
in the lens bounded by 퐼퐻0 and 퐼
퐹
0 ? We know from Figure 1 that – due to the agglomeration
eﬀects of brain drain – the equilibrium migration pattern is not necessarily unique. This implies
that certain policy combinations in the lens bounded by the two incentive constraints 퐼퐻0 and
퐼퐹0 , although consistent with non-migration, may be consistent with brain drain as well, say
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from 퐻 to 퐹 . To determine the policy domain associated with multiple migration patterns, we
consider the constraint for policy combinations that prevent brain drain from 퐻 to 퐹 . This
constraint is given by 휒퐻(푞) ≤ 1 + 휃. In analogy to (9), it can be written in the form
퐺퐻
퐺퐹
≤ 휌퐻1
(
퐴퐻
퐴퐹
) 1
1−훽
, (10)
with
휌퐻1 ≡
[
1 + 휃
1 + 휂휙훽(퐺퐹 )1−훽/(푏퐴퐹 )
] 1
1−훽
and 휂 ≡ (1+휃)/(1−푞)−(1 + 푞퐺퐻/퐺퐹 )−1 휃. For any 퐺퐹 , 휌퐻1 < 휌퐻0 . The upper bound of policy
combinations preventing brain drain from 퐻 to 퐹 is represented by the curve 퐼퐻→퐹 in Figure
2. Since 휌퐻1 < 휌
퐻
0 , the incentive constraint 퐼퐻→퐹 lies below the incentive constraint 퐼
퐻
0 . Only
relatively strong expenditure and tax cuts in the source country can outweigh the agglomeration
advantages of the receiver country. Like 퐼퐻0 , the incentive constraint 퐼퐻→퐹 rotates downward
when migration costs decline: ∂휌퐻1 /∂휃 > 0 (see Egger, Falkinger, and Grossmann, 2007).
Policy pairs in the region bounded by 퐼퐻0 and 퐼퐻→퐹 are associated with multiple migration
patterns. This multiplicity of migration equilibria constitutes a problem for the characteriza-
tion of optimal non-cooperative education policies in Section 5. The reason is that national
governments base their expenditure decisions on certain expectations concerning the equilib-
rium migration pattern. However, it is not clear how these expectations are formed if multiple
migration patterns are possible. To overcome this problem, we introduce a selection criterion
that is based on a publicly known (and identical) belief of mobile high-skilled workers about
the equilibrium (휇퐻 , 휇퐹 ) pattern.
We distinguish between two types of beliefs. As the baseline scenario, we consider “stay-
home beliefs”. Under stay-home beliefs, mobile high-skilled workers do not migrate whenever
an outcome with 휇퐻 = 휇퐹 = 0 is consistent with rational behavior. In this case, the the
scope for policies avoiding brain drain from 퐻 to 퐹 is given by 휌퐻0 , that is, (9) is the relevant
constraint. In addition to the baseline case of stay-home beliefs, we also consider the alternative
case that migration decisions are based on “go-abroad beliefs”. Under go-abroad beliefs, mobile
high-skilled workers migrate from 퐻 to 퐹 whenever 휇퐻 = 푞, 휇퐹 = 0 is consistent with rational
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behavior. In this case, mobile high-skilled workers of country 퐻 anticipate the agglomeration
eﬀects of migration and the scope for policies avoiding brain drain from 퐻 to 퐹 shrinks from
휌퐻0 to 휌
퐻
1 , that is, (10) instead of (9) becomes the relevant constraint.
5 National Education Policies
In order to shed light on optimal education policies from a national point of view, we ﬁrst have
to specify the national policy goal. Under the reasonable assumption that the median voter
does not migrate, the workers who stay are decisive for national governments. Therefore, we
look at the impact of 퐺푗 on the low-skilled workers and on the high-skilled workers who work
in 푗. By virtue of (3) and (4), the consumption levels of the low-skilled and the non-migrating
high-skilled workers are identical and given by net wage 푊 푗 ≡ (1− 휏 푗)푤푗퐿. Thus, we can take
푊 푗 as an objective function of the government.
Lemma 2 The net wage of residents in 푗 is given by
푊 푗 = 푏퐴푗
(
퐺푗
휙
)훽
− 퐺
푗
1− 휇푗 + 휇푘퐺푘/퐺푗 , 푗 ∕= 푘 ∈ {퐻,퐹}. (11)
For any given 휇푗, 휇푘 ∈ [0, 푞], objective function 푊 푗 has a unique maximum at 퐺˜푗 (휇푗, 휇푘;퐺푘)
> 0, 푗 ∕= 푘. We have (i) ∂퐺˜푗/∂휇푗 < 0, (ii) ∂퐺˜푗/∂휇푘 > 0, and (iii) ∂퐺˜푗/∂퐺푘 > 0 if 휇푘 > 0,
else ∂퐺˜푗/∂퐺푘 = 0. Moreover, (iv) 퐺˜푗
(
0, 0, 퐺푘
)
=
(
훽푏퐴푗/휙훽
)1/(1−훽)
.
For any given migration pattern, Lemma 2 characterizes 푗’s best reply to policy 퐺푘. We use
the following notation: 퐺푗0 denotes 푗’s best reply function conditional on non-migration, while
퐺푗푗→푘 is 푗’s best reply function conditional on brain drain from 푗 to 푘. However, the best reply
functions determined in Lemma 2 are not necessarily consistent with the incentive constraints
of mobile high-skilled workers. If an incentive constraint is binding, education expenditure has
to be adjusted in order to sustain the assumed migration pattern. Hence, migration incentives
limit the scope of national education policy.
Furthermore, a country may have an incentive to undercut education expenditures that are
optimal for a certain migration pattern in order to shift brain drain in its own favor. The costs
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of deviating from optimal adaptation to a given migration pattern as well as the beneﬁts of
changing the pattern of migration can be evaluated by comparing the net wage function 푊 푗 for
diﬀerent 휇푗, 휇푘 constellations. Figure 4 illustrates for the three possible equilibria identiﬁed in
Section 3 the objective function 푊퐻 and the best responses of 퐻 to a given foreign education
policy. Subscripts 퐻 → 퐹 , 0, 퐹 → 퐻 refer to migration from 퐻 to 퐹 , non-migration, and
migration from 퐹 to 퐻, respectively.
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Figure 3. Optimal education policies for different migration patterns and
deviation incentives
Figure 3: Optimal education policies for diﬀerent migration patterns and deviation incentives
The ranking 푊퐻퐻→퐹 < 푊
퐻
0 < 푊
퐻
퐹→퐻 follows from (11), and 퐺
퐻
퐻→퐹 < 퐺
퐻
0 < 퐺
퐻
퐹→퐻 follows
from Lemma 2. Figure 3 shows that deviation from 퐺퐻0 within range (퐷
퐻
0 , 퐺
퐻
0 ) would be
beneﬁcial if such a deviation induced a switch from non-migration to brain drain from 퐹 to 퐻.
Analogous bounds 퐷퐻1 , 퐷
퐻
2 for attractive deviations exist to the left of 퐺
퐻
퐻→퐹 . If 퐻 succeeds
in preventing the outﬂow of high-skilled labor (or even induces inﬂow from 퐹 ) by lowering
퐺퐻 to below 퐺퐻→퐹 , this is beneﬁcial as long as 퐺퐻 remains within the range marked by
퐷퐻1 (퐷
퐻
2 , respectively). Since, according to (11), an increase in 퐺
퐹 moves the 푊퐻 curve for
휇퐻 = 0, 휇퐹 = 푞 upward, whereas the 푊퐻 curves for (휇퐻 , 휇퐹 ) ∈ {(0, 0), (푞, 0)} are unaﬀected,
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퐷퐻0 and 퐷
퐻
2 are decreasing in 퐺
퐹 , while 퐷퐻1 is constant.
As outlined in detail in the working paper version of this manuscript, Egger, Falkinger,
and Grossmann (2007), the outcome of the policy game (in pure strategies) depends on the
belief structure and it is inconsistent with a binding incentive constraint of mobile high-skilled
workers. Let us ﬁrst consider the case of stay-home beliefs. In this case, only a policy pair
with 푁0 = (퐺
퐹
0 , 퐺
퐻
0 ) – and thus non-migration – is consistent with a best response of both
governments.7 Figure 4 shows the relevant deviation bound 퐷퐻0 from conditional equilibrium
policy 퐺퐻0 . Deviation successfully triggers brain drain from 퐹 to 퐻 if incentive constraint 퐼
퐹
0
is crossed. Thus, for high migration costs (휃2), the shaded area 퐷퐶 (“deviation cone”) to the
right of intersection point 푇0 describes the range of deviations from 퐺
퐻
0 that change the pattern
of migration in favor of 퐻 and increase 푊퐻 . There is no policy 퐺퐻 such that
(
퐺퐹0 , 퐺
퐻
) ∈ 퐷퐶.
Thus, for 휃2, 퐻 will not deviate from 퐺
퐻
0 and 푁0 is an equilibrium under rational policy setting.
However, if migration cost 휃 decreases, incentive constraint 퐼퐹0 moves closer to the 퐸퐴 line.
If 휃 is suﬃciently low (휃1), we have an incentive constraint which intersects 퐷
퐻
0 at a point
(푇 ′0) to the left of 퐺
퐹
0 . Then the deviation cone 퐷퐶
′ contains (퐺퐹0 , 퐺
퐻), for some 퐺퐻 and
퐻 will deviate from 퐺퐻0 . Hence, for suﬃciently low migration costs, non-migration cannot be
sustained in a Nash equilibrium under rational policy setting.
Under go-abroad beliefs, both 푁0 = (퐺
퐻
0 , 퐺
퐹
0 ) as well as 푁1 = (퐺
퐹
1 , 퐺
퐻
1 ), with 퐺
퐹
1 , 퐺
퐻
1 being
determined by the intersection of best response function 퐺퐹퐻→퐹 , 퐺
퐻
퐻→퐹 in (퐺퐻 , 퐺퐹 )-space, are
candidates for a non-cooperative equilibrium of rational governments. For 푁0, the deviation
incentives are analogous to the situation discussed for stay-home beliefs. If 푁1 is realized, then
the question is: Will 퐻 deviate from conditional best reply 퐺퐻퐻→퐹 to change the pattern of
migration in its favor? If 퐻 wants to avoid brain drain from 퐻 to 퐹 , it must cross incentive
constraint 퐼퐻→퐹 . Figure 5 shows constraints 퐼퐻→퐹 as well as deviation bound 퐷퐻1 (which is
independent of 퐺퐹 ) for two values of migration costs 휃1, 휃
′
1, with 휃
′
1 < 휃1. While 퐼퐻→퐹 rotates
downward when 휃 declines, conditional best replies and deviation bounds do not vary with 휃.
If migration costs are suﬃciently low (휃′1), country 퐻 has no possibility to reach the relevant
deviation cone (퐷퐶 ′1) by deviating from 푁1 =
(
퐺퐹1 , 퐺
퐻
1
)
. Given that high-skilled migrants
suﬀer a low burden due to working abroad, the expenditure and tax cuts required to prevent
13
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migration are too high to be an attractive option for 퐻. In contrast, if the burden of working
abroad were more severe (휃1), then it would be in 퐻’s national interest to induce migrants to
stay at home by deviating from 푁1 to 퐷퐶1, that is, by reducing education expenditure.
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Summarizing the insights from above, we can formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 1 A non-cooperative equilibrium (in pure strategies) may not exist. In particular,
if 휃 is suﬃciently low, an equilibrium without migration is excluded. Furthermore, an equilib-
rium with brain drain requires that individual migration decisions are based on go-abroad beliefs
and that 휃 is suﬃciently low.
6 Coordination of National Policies
Facing the results from Section 5, the national governments in 퐻 and 퐹 can examine whether
bilateral coordination of public education expenditure paired with transfer payments between
14
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the two countries is beneﬁcial for the median voters represented by immobile workers. Formally,
bilateral coordination means that the two countries 퐻 and 퐹 agree to choose education policies
퐺퐻 , 퐺퐹 that maximize the sum of the net income levels of the median voters
푊 푐 ≡ 푊퐻 +푊 퐹 (12)
subject to the incentive constraints of mobile workers and subject to the national budget con-
straints.9 The main results for coordinated policies are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 For any given education policies 퐺퐻 , 퐺퐹 > 0, 푊 푐 is higher at 휇푗 = 휇푘 = 0
than at 휇푗 = 푞, 휇푘 = 0, 푗 ∕= 푘 ∈ {퐻,퐹}. The optimal bilateral contract depends on the beliefs of
mobile high-skilled workers. (i) Under stay-home beliefs, the optimal bilateral contract supports
non-migration by coordinating on 퐺퐻0 , 퐺
퐹
0 . (ii) Under go-abroad beliefs, policies 퐺
퐻
0 , 퐺
퐹
0 are
not optimal if migration costs 휃 are suﬃciently low. In this case, governments may want to
coordinate on policies that trigger brain drain. (iii) If non-cooperative policy setting of rational
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governments leads to an equilibrium with brain drain, then coordination increases 푊 푐 and the
direction of brain drain may be reversed.
The proposition shows that national governments that serve the interests of the workers
who stay in their country have a preference for non-migration. The reason is that even though
the median voter in the host country of migrated labor would gain, this gain is lower than the
loss suﬀered by the median voter in the source country. Therefore, the country threatened by
losses from brain drain is willing to pay the other country for not triggering the drain.
If mobile high-skilled workers base their migration decision on stay-home beliefs, coordi-
nation deﬁnitely supports non-migration. This may or may not require signing a contract.
If non-migration is also the outcome of non-cooperative education policies, there is no role
for coordination because the best contract would just reproduce the non-cooperative solution.
However, according to Proposition 1, reduced migration costs tend to provoke ﬁscal competition
for foreign high-skilled workers. In this case, bilateral coordination has the role of preventing
ﬁscal competition for high-skilled labor and is deﬁnitely in the interest of the national median
voters.
If migration decisions are based on go-abroad beliefs, coordinating on 퐺퐻0 , 퐺
퐹
0 may be
less successful in establishing an equilibrium without migration. However, a bilateral contract
can stop the possibly ongoing struggle for mobile high-skilled workers under non-cooperative
policy setting. Furthermore, if non-cooperative policy setting leads to an equilibrium with
brain drain from 퐻 to 퐹 , bilateral coordination is deﬁnitely beneﬁcial for the national median
voters. The coordination may imply education policies that reverse the direction of brain drain,
leading to a factor ﬂow from 퐹 to 퐻. This result may be surprising at ﬁrst glance because
non-migration is the preferred pattern under bilateral coordination. However, non-migration is
possibly inconsistent with the optimal bilateral agreements that satisfy the incentive constraints
for mobile high-skilled workers.
The bilateral coordination perspective considered here must be clearly distinguished from
the social planner solution. National governments care about the utility of median voters but
ignore the gains of migrants. In the following, we compare education policies implemented by
a utilitarian social planner with the contract resulting from bilateral coordination of education
16
policies.
One can show that a utilitarian social planner chooses education policies in such a way that
푆푊 = 푊 푐 + 휇퐻푊퐻
[
휒퐻/ (1 + 휃)− 1]+ 휇퐹푊 퐹 [휒퐹/ (1 + 휃)− 1] (13)
is maximized, subject to the incentive constraints of mobile high-skilled workers and the budget
constraints of governments. For given education policies, 푆푊 is not necessarily higher at
휇푗 = 휇푘 = 0 than at 휇푗 > 0, 휇푘 = 0, 푗 ∕= 푘 ∈ {퐻,퐹}. The outcome of this comparison depends
on the size of migration gains 휇푗푊 푗 [휒푗/ (1 + 휃)− 1], which are part of 푆푊 in (13), but are not
considered in the 푊 푐-maximizing contract. Hence, the social planner is more likely to opt for
a migration equilibrium in order to reap the migration gains of mobile high-skilled labor.
In the working paper version of this manuscript, we undertake two numerical simulation
exercises in order to shed further light on how the social planner solution deviates from non-
cooperative policies and the bilateral contract. However, in the interest of brevity, we do not
present these exercises here. Instead, we summarize the main insights from these exercises
as follows and refer the reader, who is interested in further details, to Egger, Falkinger, and
Grossmann (2007):
Proposition 3 Bilateral coordination can help to increase public education expenditure to above
suboptimal non-cooperative levels. Moreover, it is useful for overcoming an ongoing battle for
mobile high-skilled workers. However, (i) bilateral coordination is biased toward non-migration,
and (ii) it may reverse the direction of brain drain compared to both the non-cooperative policy
game and the social planner solution; (iii) from a social planner’s point of view, non-cooperative
education policies can be better than bilateral coordination.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper aimed at shedding light on opportunities of and incentives for national governments
to provide public ﬁnance for higher education and to compete for educated workers. For this
purpose we analyzed a simple two-country model in which countries may diﬀer in TFP and
where brain drain has agglomeration eﬀects because it aﬀects the tax base in both source and
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receiver country. Within this framework, we compared public education expenditure levels,
migration patterns, and welfare in non-cooperative political equilibria with the outcomes under
bilateral coordination and the social planner solution. As a key result we found that bilateral
coordination can reduce the under-investment problem in public education spending but at the
same time it tends to hinder migration or may even reverse the direction of the migration ﬂow
that materializes under non-cooperative policy setting. Due to its potentially adverse eﬀects
on migration patterns, bilateral coordination may therefore reduce global welfare and bring the
world economy further away from the social planner’s solution.
In the interest of analytical tractability, we had to impose several simplifying assumptions
which might limit the practical relevance of our analysis. For instance, we have ignored in-
tertemporal externalities from migration of high-skilled labor – such as changes in productivity.
Furthermore, we have not allowed for other forms of policy coordination, like international
agreements on taxing graduates.10 While both of these extensions would be worthwhile to
consider in our framework, they are clearly beyond the scope of this paper.
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Notes
1In most advanced countries, the bulk of higher education is indeed ﬁnanced by the public sector. In 2005,
the average share of public expenditure for tertiary education within the OECD and the EU19 was 73.1 and
82.5 per cent, respectively (OECD, 2008, Tab. B3.2b).
2Policy coordination in higher education has been a major priority in the EU. On the one hand, the recent
reforms of national university programs that aim at establishing a uniform European Bachelor/Master system
(“Bologna process”) are an important step towards stronger coordination in tertiary education policies in
Europe. On the other hand, these eﬀorts have been accompanied by a discussion about measures to smooth the
risk of brain drain. For instance, the Council of Europe (1995) has recommended that in order to “strengthen
higher education and [...] diminish the risk of brain drain, countries are strongly encouraged to [...] develop
structured programmes of European and regional, bilateral and multilateral cooperation at government level.”
3Even though the ﬁscal externality is highly relevant (see Lucas, 2005, ch. 4), there may of course be
other externalities that generate agglomeration eﬀects. For instance, Schiﬀ (2004) argues that the loss of social
capital constitutes a key negative externality in the source country of emigration. Borjas (1995) points to
positive externalities of immigration due to its positive eﬀect on market size and productivity in the destination
country. Carrington, Detragiache, and Vishwanath (1996) argue that emigration exhibits a positive externality
as it reduces migration cots for subsequent migrants.
4That low-skilled workers are immobile is a standard assumption in the brain drain literature (see Chau
and Stark, 1999), even though a few recent studies on the matter allow for simultaneous migration of both
high-skilled and low-skilled workers at diﬀering intensities (see Bellettini and Berti Ceroni, 2007).
5Restricting the analysis to two types of individuals with respect to migration costs greatly simpliﬁes the
analysis. However, the main insights from our analysis would remain the same if more than two types of agents
were taken into account. The assumption that not all high-skilled workers can emigrate (푞 < 1) is standard
in the migration literature and it guarantees that the mass of educated workers is higher than the mass of
high-skilled emigrants so that production does not entirely break down in the source country of emigration.
6By assuming (4), we exclude the case of countries with zero higher education from the analytical discussion.
For further discussion on this issue, see our working paper Egger, Falkinger, and Grossmann (2007)
7Under stay-home beliefs of mobile high-skilled workers there is no brain drain from 퐻 to 퐹 if both govern-
ments choose polices in accordance with their best responses 퐺퐹퐻→퐹 , 퐺
퐻
퐻→퐹 . Hence, a pure strategy equilibrium
with migration is inconsistent with stay-home beliefs.
8Apart from avoiding an outﬂow of high-skilled workers, country 퐻 could choose an education policy that
leads to reversed brain drain and attracts high-skilled workers educated in 퐹 . This case is discussed in the
working paper version of this manuscript: Egger, Falkinger, and Grossmann (2007).
9We focus on transfer payments that do not aﬀect the migration decision.
10See Poutvaara (2004, 2008) for a discussion.
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